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When newly public firms emerge from relative obscurity, the quality of their financial reporting 
is often questioned by investors. However, the determinants of financial reporting quality in 
newly public firms are still largely unexplored. It is often assumed these firms resemble each 
other, but they actually differ quite dramatically in terms of the financing they receive before 
going public. Financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide 
financing, they also play an active role in firm governance and in financial practices before the 
firm goes public. Venture capitalists are actively engaged in monitoring and advising their 
portfolio firms. Thus, we also expect them to exert significant influence over the development 
of financial reporting practices. This chapter reviews recent literature and empirical evidence 
on VCs and financial reporting quality in newly public firms. We survey the role of VCs in 
such activities as earnings management. In particular, we discuss how their monitoring 
activities and reputation can impact how their portfolio firms establish financial reporting 
practices. Subsequently, we also review the consequences of misreporting, and whether they 
affect VC behavior ex ante. Finally, we use recent data to provide empirical evidence on the 
effect of VCs on accrual and real earnings management.   
 





The transition from private to public ownership at the time of an initial public offering 
(IPO) has far-reaching consequences. For example, newly public firms must face increased 
scrutiny from investors and analysts, as well as a substantial increase in financial reporting 
requirements. Although these firms face similar public market pressures at the time of an IPO, 
there are significant differences during the pre-IPO period that can affect their post-IPO 
behavior. During a firm’s development entrepreneurs and owners often develop very different 
governance mechanisms and financial reporting practices, which can have long-term effects 
even after a firm becomes listed on a stock exchange.  
Theories about the separation of ownership and control assume that firms at the time of 
an IPO are basically similar in terms of governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Grossman and Hart, 1988; Zingales, 1995). However, these theories ignore the role that 
financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists (VCs), investment banks, and others play in 
establishing firm governance, reporting, and control structures.  
VCs can play a significant role in reducing the agency costs between investors and firms 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001). They also provide advice and act as monitors (Gompers, 1995; 
Lerner, 1995; Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007; Beuselinck et al., 2008; Nahata, 2008; Nahata 
et al., 2014; Ritter, 2015). However, as the providers of capital to entrepreneurial companies, 
VCs need to rely heavily on the financial data provided by firm management. It is thus crucial 
that this information be of the highest quality in order to ensure prudent investing and financing 
decisions. 
 Financial reporting quality can be measured in many different ways. The most common 




The use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, 
earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how 
underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings. 
 
Because VCs have such a strong influence on the governance, reporting, and control 
practices of their portfolio firms, one would expect to find higher-quality reporting in VC-
backed firms, i.e., lower accrual earnings management, than in non-VC-backed firms. 
Morsfield and Tan (2006) show that VC-backed firms tend to exhibit lower earnings 
management in newly public firms due to their monitoring role, which would further explain 
superior post-IPO performance.  
Lee and Masulis (2011) study the role of financial intermediaries such as VCs and 
investment banks (IBs). They find that only the more reputable VCs and IBs restrain earnings 
management in IPO firms.  
Besides accrual earnings management, firms can also change real economic decisions 
to influence earnings. They can reduce discretionary spending, such as advertising and research 
and development (R&D) expenses, to manage earnings numbers. This dimension of earnings 
management is called real earnings management, because it distorts real economic decisions. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines it as: 
 
Management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken 
with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds. 
 
These distortions have long-term negative effects on firm performance. Wongsunwai 
(2013) shows that VC-backed firms tend to exhibit lower earnings management through 
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accruals manipulation and real activities. He also finds that VC-backed firms have lower rates 
of financial restatements.  
Finally, financial reporting quality can also be measured through the quality of internal 
control mechanisms. Cumming et al. (2016) analyze disclosures of material weaknesses in 
internal control under the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). They find that VC-backed firms 
disclose fewer material weaknesses in internal control, and those disclosures are more 
informative to the public markets.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the role VCs play in the financing of young companies. In section 3, we discuss measures 
and empirical evidence of financial reporting quality. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on 
the role of VCs in the earnings management behavior of firms around IPOs. Section 5 
concludes, and we discuss future research in section 6. 
2. Venture capital 
2.1. VC investors 
Venture capitalists are a special type of owners. Acting as financial intermediaries, they 
reduce the agency costs between investors and entrepreneurs (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
Typically organized as limited partnerships, they raise funds from limited partners such as 
pension funds, high net worth individuals, endowments, and banks. As general partners, VCs 
are in charge of investing the money raised into portfolio companies. Their main activities 
include identifying and screening investment opportunities, executing the chosen deals, 
monitoring and advising the portfolio companies, and managing exit strategies. The typical 
time span from fundraising through exit is four to ten years, and VCs usually charge limited 
partners for basic management and performance fees (for more details, see, for example, 
Phalippou et al., 2016).  
2.2. VCs’ monitoring role 
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In their role as general partners, VCs take charge of investing the money raised into 
their portfolio companies, and they are heavily involved in firm management as well. Gorman 
and Sahlman (1989) note that VCs tend to visit their portfolio firms regularly and hold frequent 
meetings with management. They also work closely with the entrepreneurs and negotiate 
complex contracts with the portfolio firms, relating to, e.g., the split of returns, the allocation 
of control rights, and liquidation events (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) analyze a sample of contracts between VCs and 
entrepreneurs, and show that the main mechanisms VCs use to ensure smooth cooperation with 
entrepreneurs are residual cash flow rights, board and voting rights, liquidation rights, and 
redemption rights. VCs typically get 55% residual cash flow rights, and from 41% to 46% of 
board seats in normal and adverse states, respectively.  
Although the sample used in Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) is relatively small, other 
literature also shows the importance of contract design in the effective monitoring of portfolio 
firms (Hsu, 2004; Masulis and Nahata, 2009). Caselli et al. (2013) argue that the negotiated 
contracts usually feature a company performance component. Also, Cumming and Johan 
(2013) show that the contracts between VCs and entrepreneurs often improve the transparency 
of information flow. Masulis and Nahata (2011) report that, at exit, the purchase price of 
companies being monitored by VCs is demonstrably higher.  
Another method VCs use to manage their portfolio firm investments is to allocate 
promised funding over several stages. The frequency of refinancing usually varies from a few 
months to a few years. Gompers (1995) finds that the number of financing stages depends on 
the expected agency costs between the VCs and entrepreneurs. “Staging” the funding 
installments serves as a hedge to control risk and increase VCs’ bargaining power.  
 2.3. VCs and newly public firms 
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Several papers have suggested that more than 50% of newly public firms are backed by 
VC investors (Wongsunwai, 2013). Previous literature has shown that VC-backed firms are 
more successful than non-VC-backed firms. They have better post-IPO performance, are more 
innovative, have better governance mechanisms, and are less susceptible to fraud.  
Other studies highlight the role of reputation in VC performance. In particular, Nahata 
(2008) shows that firms backed by more reputable VCs exit through IPO or acquisition, are 
faster at accessing public markets, and are more productive overall.1 Krishnan et al. (2011) 
report that VC-backed firms have better post-IPO performance than non-VC-backed firms in 
terms of better return on assets (ROA), higher market-to-book (M/B) ratios, survival rates, 
returns, and lower research and development (R&D) expenditures. In a similar vein, Nahata et 
al. (2014) report that VC backing positively affects both firm performance and survival.  
Several studies show that VC-backed firms also have higher patent rates (Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000; Bernstein et al., 2016). In fact, Tian and Wang (2014) posit that VCs have a 
generally higher tolerance for failure and are therefore more willing to support risky and 
innovative activities.  
Evidence suggests that VC-backed firms enjoy better governance mechanisms as well. 
VCs need to establish sound governance practices in order to effectively manage their portfolio 
firms. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004) find that preliminary governance structures are 
generally established just after the VC investment occurs. Hochberg (2012) shows that VC-
backed firms have better governance (e.g., lower earnings management), react more positively 
to the adoption of shareholder agreements, and have more independent boards. Tian et al. 
(2015) find that VCs are monitored externally as well. They show that markets punish VC 
funds that are less efficient at preventing fraud in newly public firms.  
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion on the effect of VC reputation, see Krishnan and Masulis (2011). 
7 
 
Overall, we conclude that VC-backed firms tend to be more successful than otherwise 
similar non-VC-backed firms. This success is presumably achieved through the thorough 
screening and monitoring activities that VCs implement in their portfolio firms. However, in 
order to monitor and screen effectively, portfolio firms must first have solid financial reporting 
and control practices in place.  
2.4. Why and when do newly public firms manage earnings?  
VC investors typically prefer IPOs as an exit strategy. They generally aim to exit their 
portfolio investments within a specific period of time, and return the realized capital or shares 
in the newly public firm to the limited partners. Because VC investors earn performance fees 
on those investments, their goal is usually to maximize the price of the firm. Moreover, 
although they can sell some shares at the time of the IPO, they typically offload most of their 
shares to the market after the lock-up period, which usually lasts for 180 days. Therefore, VC 
investors may allow for a temporary change in reporting quality just prior to their exit in order 
to shed positive light on the portfolio firm’s financial prospects. This would have direct 
consequences for the profits of VC investors, as it allows them to report higher returns to 
limited partners.  
3. Financial reporting quality  
3.1. Measures of financial reporting quality 
Financial reporting quality can be difficult to measure in practice. Previous literature 
has used earnings management measures as proxies for financial reporting quality. However, 
earnings management can be difficult to assess because it depends largely on managerial 
discretion and is not directly observable.  
Jones (1991) and Kothari et al. (2005) propose several methods to proxy for earnings 
management based on, e.g., accruals. However, there are other methods firms can use that are 
not reflected in accruals. For example, firms can adjust real activities and assumptions, such as 
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what discount rate they use to calculate pension obligations. While there are conceptual issues 
surrounding whether accruals are in fact a good measure of earnings management, some studies 
proxy for financial reporting quality using alternative measures. One broader measure of 
management practice is internal control quality, such as disclosures of material weaknesses in 
internal control that are mandated by law.  
3.2. Accruals-based measures 
 Total accruals are the difference between income and cash flows during a specific 
period. Management has multiple options at its disposal to manipulate income through 
accounting policy choices. Although early studies used total accruals to proxy for earnings 
management, not all accruals are reflective of the potential to manipulate earnings. We 
distinguish here between non-discretionary (unmanaged) and discretionary (managed) 
accruals. Therefore, the key to detecting earnings management is to estimate discretionary 
accruals (𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡), that is, the difference between total (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡) and expected (𝐸[𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡]) accruals: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 −  𝐸[𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡]        (1) 
The methodology of calculating discretionary accruals varies from model to model. 
DeAngelo (1988) proposes using the difference between total accruals at time t less the total 
accruals from the previous period as a measure of discretionary accruals. One drawback with 
this approach is that it assumes non-discretionary accruals are constant over time. Dechow et 
al. (1995) correct for this issue, and estimate discretionary accruals as the difference between 
total and average accruals for a particular sector. However, this approach assumes that other 
firms do not manage earnings. 
Jones (1991) proposes a more sophisticated solution: a regression-based time series 
approach to estimating discretionary accruals. First, total accruals are modeled to estimate 
parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡−𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡−𝑛     (2) 
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where ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 are changes in revenue, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is investment in properties, plant, and 
equipment. Second, discretionary accruals are estimated as total accruals less estimated 
accruals, where estimated accruals are calculated using the parameters from the first regression: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑡 − (?̃? + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡)     (3) 
Due to significant restrictions on the sample in the time series, however, DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) propose a cross-sectional model, where total accruals are again estimated for each 
industry-year pair based on two-digit SIC codes: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡−𝑛    (4) 
Discretionary accruals are then estimated as total accruals less estimated accruals: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑡 − (?̃? + 𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡)      (5) 
Multiple variations of the original Jones (1991) model have been put forth over time. For 
example, Kothari et al. (2005) extend Jones’s (1991) model by including lagged returns on 
assets (ROA), and calculating total accruals as working capital accruals only.  
3.3. Real activities manipulation 
 Managerial discretion can also take the form of real activities manipulation. In contrast 
to accruals-based manipulation, where managers exercise their discretion based on various 
accounting choices, real activities manipulation involves changes in normal operations with 
the explicit aim of misleading investors into believing that financial performance was achieved 
under normal conditions (Roychowdhury, 2006). While accruals-based manipulation does not 
typically involve changing operations, real activities manipulation does alter normal firm 
policies. It can thus take various forms, such as sales manipulation through increased discounts, 
and decreases in spending on research and development (R&D) or advertising (Graham et al., 
2005; Wongsunwai, 2013; Kothari et al., 2016). Several studies find that firms manipulate both 
accruals and real activities. For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2016) 
show that manipulations occur around seasoned equity offerings.  
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In order to measure real earnings management effectively, we need to focus on 
strategies that influence various indicators. We follow Roychowdhury (2006), and calculate 
two metrics to capture the acceleration of price discounts or more lenient credit terms, the 
reporting of lower cost of goods sold (COGS) through increased production, and decreases in 
discretionary spending, such as advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses.  
We first model normal levels of cash flow from operations (CFO) per industry-year, 
and then calculate our real earnings management metric as the difference from normal levels. 
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Abnormal CFO is then calculated as the difference from normal CFO using the estimated 
coefficients from (6). 
We also follow Roychowdhury (2006) in modeling COGS, normal production costs 

































+ 𝜀𝑡    (9) 
In order to capture real earnings management, we combine these three measures into two 
metrics, as per Zang (2006). For the first metric, we multiply abnormal discretionary expenses 
by 1 and add to abnormal production costs (REM1). For the second metric, we multiply 
abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by 1, and then 
aggregate the two variables into one metric (REM2). Overall, higher values for both metrics 
are correlated with higher levels of real earnings management. 
3.4. Evidence on earnings management 
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We next focus on the empirical evidence on earnings management. Graham et al.’s 
(2005) survey based on interviews with U.S. managers indicates they perceive earnings as the 
most important financial metric, and will try to smooth earnings over time. As we noted earlier, 
earnings management can be difficult to detect, so studies have focused primarily on major 
corporate events such as 1) equity issues, 2) mergers and acquisitions, and 3) earnings games 
(Walker, 2013). We describe these three events in more detail next.  
First, firms have incentives to overestimate earnings in expectation of an equity issue, 
whether it be an IPO or a SEO, because an overvaluation allows for a smooth wealth transfer 
from new to current shareholders. Several studies find that managers make income-increasing 
adjustments prior to IPOs (Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998c; DuCharme et al., 2004; Rangan, 1998; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) and SEOs (Teoh et al., 1998b). However, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) find no evidence of earnings management before IPOs for a U.K. sample. Lo (2008) 
posits that it is difficult to reach a conclusion on this subject, while Fan (2007) finds it depends 
on ownership structure.  
Second, firms may have incentives to misreport in anticipation of a merger or 
acquisition for reasons similar to those in the case of equity offerings. Early studies found that 
managers have little incentive to increase earnings before management buyouts (DeAngelo, 
1988; Perry and Williams, 1994). However, firms using their own stock as a method of 
payment may opt to manage earnings upward in order to inflate the value of their payment 
currency before the acquisition (Erickson and Wang, 1999).  
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) find that target firms may also be engaged in 
earnings management. They identify a sample of targets that put themselves up for sale and 
then managed their earnings downward during the years surrounding the announcement year. 
They seemed to facilitate the completion of the deal at the cost of shareholders.  
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Third, firms may have incentives to misreport if they engage in earnings games to meet 
analyst forecasts (Walker, 2013). Many firms intend to beat analysts’ forecasts to send positive 
signals to the market. There is a large branch of literature illustrating how firms manage 
earnings before earnings disclosures in order to meet analyst forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003; Kasznik, 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). Also, evidence from U.K. managers 
suggests they engage in real earnings management (Choi et al., 2006).  
Garcia-Osma and Young (2009) find that U.K. firms are more likely to cut R&D 
expenditures in the financial year following a year that a firm failed to report positive earnings 
levels and changes. But the analysts and investors serve as external monitors, and it is not 
possible to detect the very opaque strategies used to manipulate earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2008).  
4. Evidence on VC and financial reporting quality 
4.1. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Our sample includes all IPOs in the SDC Thomson One database from 1980 through 
2015. We use the U.S. public marketplace, with “common shares” as the security type. 
Following prior studies, we exclude equity offerings of financial institutions (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999), real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-end funds, spin-offs, 
former LBOs, and foreign firms, because their disclosure requirements differ strongly from 
those of other firms. We also only include issues with offer prices that are higher than $5. We 
use Compustat to match financial data. Our final sample consists of 825 IPOs.  
This sample size highlights the recent downward trend of U.S. listings compared to that 
of international listings (Doidge et al., 2016). Gao et al. (2013) posit that the recent drop in U.S 
IPO volume is caused by the economies of scope hypothesis. They posit that smaller firms are 
being acquired more rapidly by firms who desire fast growth as a means to maximize profits 
over a shorter time frame. We focus on the U.S., because previous research has demonstrated 
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the impact of different institutional environments on financial market outcomes (Cumming and 
Johan, 2013). Concentrating on the U.S. also allows us to isolate the effect of VC backing on 
earnings management. 
From the data, we can observe whether a company obtained VC backing. Our primary 
test variable is VC, which equals 1 if the sample company was backed by a VC fund at the time 
of its IPO, and 0 otherwise.  
We measure earnings management using several proxies. First, we calculate the 
measure of earnings management (DA) based on abnormal accruals by using a cross-sectional 
version of the Jones (1991) model, modified as in Dechow et al. (1995). Second, following 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we calculate two measures of real earnings management, REM1 
and REM2. 
We also include several control variables that have been linked to earnings management 
in prior studies: return on assets (ROA) to control for a firm’s profitability and performance, 
the debt-to-equity ratio (leverage) to control for a firm’s financial health, the book-to-market 
(BM) ratio to proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities, and firm size (size). Finally, we control 
for firm growth (sales growth) because we expect rapid expansion to affect financial reporting 
quality. We also include industry and year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic shocks.  
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for non-VC-backed firms (at the top), VC-backed 
firms (in the middle), and the full sample (at the bottom). Earnings management proxies (DA, 
REM1, and REM2) show that the mean is lower for VC-backed firms, suggesting those firms 
are less likely engage in managing reported earnings upward. In unreported t-tests, the 
difference in means between VC- and non-VC-backed firms is statistically significant. 
Summary statistics suggest that VC-backed firms have lower ROA, leverage, book to market, 
size, and sales growth.  
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Table 2 shows the correlations between variables. We find that the correlations between 
accruals and real earnings management measures are positive but low. As expected, the 
correlation between the two real earnings management metrics is strongly positive.  
 
[Please insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
4.2. Results 
This subsection discusses the results from our regression analysis. Table 3 shows the 
effect of VC backing on the first measure of accrual-based earnings management (DA). All the 
tables show the results as follows: for the three years surrounding the IPO in model (1), the one 
year prior to the IPO in model (2), the one year after the IPO in model (3), and the two years 
after the IPO in model (4).  
The results suggest a negative effect of VC backing overall on earnings management. 
However, this effect is driven by earnings management before the IPO, which suggests that 
VC-backed firms engage in significantly lower levels of accrual earnings management pre-IPO 
in order to protect the reputation of the VC. For the three years surrounding the IPO, VC-
backed firms exhibit discretionary accruals of about 4% of total assets, which is less than 
comparable non-VC-backed firms. This effect increases to 9% if we focus on the year prior to 
the IPO. In contrast, post-IPO earnings management is not significantly different between VC- 
and non-VC-backed companies.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 shows results for the effect of VC backing on REM1, the first measure of real 
earnings management. A higher REM1 implies a higher likelihood that the firm is involved in 
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upward earnings management by sales manipulation and/or decreases in discretionary 
expenditures as a means to temporarily increase earnings. The results show a negative and 
statistically significant effect of VC backing on real earnings management across all models. 
Moreover, the coefficient sizes are quite large, pointing to an economically significant effect. 
 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 gives results for the effect of VC backing on REM2, the second measure of 
earnings management. In a similar fashion, a higher REM2 implies a higher likelihood that the 
firm is involved in upward earnings management. The results again show a negative and 
statistically significant effect of VC backing on earnings management.  
 




This chapter reviews the role venture capitalists play in the financing of young 
companies. We find that VCs impact not only financing and investment decisions, but also the 
financial reporting structures of their portfolio firms. Financial reporting integrity is vital to 
investors, because it is the fundamental channel through which information is communicated. 
We find that VCs have a strong impact on the financial reporting decisions of their portfolio 
firms. Furthermore, we find that VC-backed firms tend to engage in less earnings management, 
both accrual-based and real. This effect is strongest for the period surrounding the IPO, when 
the VC is still invested in the company. Overall, our findings underline the strong impact of 
VCs on their portfolio firms’ accounting choices. 
6. Future research 
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Many studies have found evidence that IPO market-based reputation measures affect 
earnings management. However, none has yet explored the reporting quality of VC 
performance to their limited partners in-depth. Future research may want to control for VC 
heterogeneity in terms of how fund performance reporting behavior affects post-IPO reporting 
behavior. For example, Cumming and Walz (2010) use an international sample, and document 
that fund performance reporting behavior depends on a country’s legal and accounting 
environment. And Johan and Zhang (2016) note that the reporting behavior of PE funds is 
correlated with a tendency to overstate performance reports. Therefore, it would be interesting 
to examine 1) how institutional and legal environments affect earnings management in newly 
public firms, and 2) how the tendency to report inflated valuations to limited partners affects 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table gives the descriptive statistics for our 1980-2015 sample. Data on venture capital 
backing comes from Thomson SDC; financial accounting data comes from Compustat. DA are 
discretionary accruals calculated as per Jones (1991). REM1 and REM2 are real earnings 
measured as in Roychowdhury (2006). 
 
       
 N Mean Median Std. Dev P25 P75 
Non-VC-backed       
DA 267 0.02 -0.02 0.25 -0.06 0.03 
REM1 267 0.57 0.16 2.46 -0.10 0.89 
REM2 267 0.10 0.01 2.01 -0.46 0.38 
ROA 267 0.03 0.06 0.23 -0.00 0.12 
Leverage 267 0.25 0.14 0.32 0.00 0.41 
BM 267 0.53 0.38 1.61 0.24 0.60 
Size 267 5.78 5.82 1.52 4.63 6.91 
Sales growth 267 134.27 45.38 349.06 6.30 135.23 
VC-backed       
DA 558 -0.03 -0.04 0.24 -0.10 0.02 
REM1 558 0.09 -0.04 1.45 -0.49 0.47 
REM2 558 -0.33 -0.27 1.65 -1.10 0.32 
ROA 558 -0.09 0.03 0.86 -0.09 0.10 
Leverage 558 0.13 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.18 
BM 558 0.39 0.30 0.38 0.17 0.49 
Size 558 5.28 5.16 1.13 4.63 5.88 
Sales growth 558 62.86 28.21 299.39 11.15 61.63 
Total       
DA 825 -0.01 -0.03 0.24 -0.09 0.02 
REM1 825 0.25 0.05 1.85 -0.38 0.57 
REM2 825 -0.19 -0.14 1.78 -0.94 0.32 
ROA 825 -0.05 0.04 0.72 -0.06 0.10 
Leverage 825 0.17 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.28 
BM 825 0.44 0.33 0.97 0.19 0.53 
Size 825 5.44 5.33 1.29 4.63 6.26 





Table 2. Correlation matrix 
This table gives the Pearson correlations for our variables. DA are discretionary accruals 
calculated as per Jones (1991). REM1 and REM2 are real earnings measured as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
         
 DA REM1 REM2 ROA Leverage BM Size Sales 
growth 
DA 1        
REM1 0.0134 1       
REM2 0.0765* 0.504*** 1      
ROA -0.0325 0.0492 -0.089* 1     
Leverage -0.0088 -0.0331 0.141*** -0.402*** 1    
BM -0.0535 0.0569 0.0488 0.0749* -0.122*** 1   
Size -0.20*** -0.090** -0.0276 0.381*** 0.201*** 0.0708* 1  





Table 3. VC backing and accrual earnings management 
This table shows results from regressing accrual earnings management on venture capital 
backing (VC) and our control variables. DA are discretionary accruals calculated as per Jones 
(1991). REM1 and REM2 are real earnings measured as in Roychowdhury (2006). Model (1) 
shows results for the three years surrounding the IPO, model (2) shows results for the one year 
prior to the IPO, model (3) shows results for the one year after the IPO, and model (4) shows 
results for the two years after the IPO. Industry fixed effects are included, and robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DA DA DA DA 
VC -0.038** -0.090** -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) 
     
ROA 0.030 -0.014 -0.128 0.060** 
 (0.029) (0.105) (0.108) (0.019) 
     
Leverage 0.023 -0.007 -0.003 0.125 
 (0.066) (0.059) (0.077) (0.082) 
     
BM -0.012 -0.050 -0.057 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.079) (0.036) (0.005) 
     
Size -0.048** -0.096** -0.015 -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.012) (0.018) 
     
Sales growth 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant 0.382** 1.029** 0.087 0.165 
 (0.157) (0.445) (0.087) (0.122) 
N 825 275 275 275 





Table 4. VC backing and real earnings management (REM1) 
This table shows results from regressing real earnings management on venture capital backing 
(VC) and our control variables. REM1 is real earnings measured as in Roychowdhury (2006). 
Model (1) shows results for the three years surrounding the IPO, model (2) shows results for 
the one year prior to the IPO, model (3) shows results for the one year after the IPO, and model 
(4) shows results for the two years after the IPO. Industry fixed effects are included, and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 REM1 REM1 REM1 REM1 
VC -0.702*** -0.669*** -0.574*** -0.712*** 
 (0.067) (0.182) (0.128) (0.149) 
     
ROA 0.268 0.525 1.304*** 0.119 
 (0.202) (0.511) (0.315) (0.195) 
     
Leverage -0.049 0.414 0.054 -0.184 
 (0.308) (0.878) (0.245) (0.666) 
     
BM 0.036 0.368 0.321 0.014 
 (0.040) (0.286) (0.185) (0.036) 
     
Size 0.095* 0.031 -0.043 0.053 
 (0.052) (0.175) (0.080) (0.120) 
     
Sales growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant -1.913*** -0.628 -1.111* -1.643* 
 (0.349) (1.303) (0.595) (0.737) 
N 825 275 275 275 




Table 5. VC backing and real earnings management (REM2) 
This table shows results from regressing real earnings management on venture capital backing 
(VC) and our control variables. REM2 is real earnings measured as in Roychowdhury (2006). 
Model (1) shows results for the three years surrounding the IPO, model (2) shows results for 
the one year prior to the IPO, model (3) shows results for the one year after the IPO, and model 
(4) shows results for the two years after the IPO. Industry fixed effects are included, and robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 REM2 REM2 REM2 REM2 
VC -0.296*** -0.421** -0.207 -0.215 
 (0.079) (0.157) (0.118) (0.179) 
     
ROA -0.040 -0.144 0.373 0.032 
 (0.072) (0.208) (0.330) (0.107) 
     
Leverage 0.066 0.282 0.080 0.266 
 (0.169) (0.488) (0.232) (0.418) 
     
BM 0.042 0.698*** 0.258 0.006 
 (0.046) (0.164) (0.203) (0.036) 
     
Size 0.113** 0.236* 0.024 -0.022 
 (0.047) (0.117) (0.034) (0.062) 
     
Sales growth 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Constant -2.639*** -5.282*** -2.049*** -1.551*** 
 (0.355) (1.024) (0.297) (0.392) 
N 825 275 275 275 
Adj. R2 0.728 0.745 0.749 0.739 
 
 
 
